Jena and Auerstadt
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he twin
battles of Jena and Auerstadt (older name: Auerstaedt)
were fought on October 14, 1806 on the plateau west of the river Saale in
today's Germany, between the forces of Napoleon I of France and Frederick
William III of Prussia.
Let us summarize the prelude to
this situation. On October 8, the two armies were on either side of the
Thueringerwald forest, the French to the south, the Prussians to the north. The
latter then initiated a movement intended to go around Napoleon while he was
crossing the mountains in the northwest, but the Emperor got ahead of them by
doubling back to Frankenwald in the southeast. By descending into the valley of
the Saale, the French Army reached Jena on October 13, both behind and on the
flank of the Prussian positions.
Fearing
encirclement, the Prussian commander, Brunswick, accompanied by the King of
Prussia and Queen Louise by whose grace all these soldiers were to be torn to
pieces, pulled back his 70,000 men in the direction of the Elbe, while Hohenlohe,
with his 50,000 troops, was ordered to cover the withdrawal.
In
addition to these troops, there were 20,000 more under the Prince of
Wuerttemberg in Magdeburg, and 25,000 others in Silesia, making a total of some
165,000 combatants.
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oth armies were split into separate parts: Napoleon's main force at Jena
consisted of Soult's IV Corps, Lannes' V Corps, Ney's VI Corps, Augereau's VII
Corps, and the cavalry of Murat, about 96,000 men in total. Further north, in
the vicinity of Auerstadt, was Bernadotte's I Corps (20,000 strong) and
Davout's III Corps (27,000). Opposing them, the Prussian king had three forces:
55,000 men under the Duke of Brunswick, 38,000 under Prince Hohenlohe, and
15,000 under General von Ruechel.
Prussian Headquarter 1806 Kapellendorf

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he battles began when elements of
Napoleon's main force encountered Hohenlohe's troops near Jena. Initially only
48,000 strong, the Emperor took advantage of his carefully-planned and flexible
dispositions to rapidly build up a crushing superiority. The Prussians were
slow to grasp the situation, and slower still to react. Before Ruechel's 15,000
men could arrive from Weimar, Hohenlohe's force was routed. Nevertheless, it
was a fierce battle, and Napoleon mistakenly believed that he had faced the
main body of the Prussian army.
Further north at Auerstaedt, both Davout and Bernadotte received orders to
come to Napoleon's aid. Davout attempted to comply, but Bernadotte, for reasons
never fully explained, did not. Davout's route south, however, was blocked by
the Prussian main force of 55,000 men, including the King in person. A savage
battle ensued. Although outnumbered two to one, Davout's superbly trained and
disciplined III Corps endured repeated attacks before eventually taking the
offensive and putting the Prussians to flight.
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he battle of Jena began with the chance evening meeting of Marshal Lannes'
corps and a Prussian force of 38,000 men under General Friedrich Hohenlohe.
Sending for immediate
reinforcements, Lannes camped near the enemy positions. Throughout the night
new units moved up until French forces numbered at least 50,000, and more were
on the way, ensuring Napoleon Bonaparte would have some 90,000 men available.
The initial French move was to push the
Prussians into open ground, where the advantage of numbers would be telling,
and while the resistance was strong it was eventually achieved. Hohenlohe
urgently sent for assistance from Ruechel's nearby 15,000 men and hoped to hold
on until they arrived.
Meanwhile,
all of the good work done by marshals Augereau and Lannes was almost undone by
the impatient Marshal Ney, who launched an unauthorised assault in the centre.
Neither side could believe the stupidity of the assault and soon Ney was in
danger of being swamped by Prussian cavalry. Fortunately for the fiery marshal,
Lannes, Bertrand, and massed French cavalry intervened before the trap could
shut.
Windmill
at Krippendorf See
previous illustration

At 1 pm,
Bonaparte ordered a general advance and within two hours the exhausted
Prussians gave way, fleeing the field and trying to avoid the sabres of Marshal
Murat's horsemen. Jena cost Bonaparte some 5,000 men, but the Prussians had a
staggering 25,000 casualties.
Estimates of Hohenlohe's Prussian-Saxon army on 14 October usually range from 50 battalions, 74 squadrons and 12 ½ batteries [37,000 men] to 50 battalions, 77 squadrons and 15 batteries [46,500 men] -- with between 74 and 120 guns. Some sources cite his total strength as high as 53,000 men. Many of these estimates do not include Ruechel's Corps, which, although it fought at Jena, was a separate command. Ruechel is believed to have arrived on the battlefield with 12,000-15,000 troops.
Two Prussian formations in the theatre of operations were not present at either Jena or Auerstaedt: the Prussian General Reserve Corps (15,000 men in 18 battalions, 20 squadrons and 4 batteries under Generalleutnant Herzog Eugen Friedrich Heinrich von Wuerttemberg) and the main army's "Advanced Guard" detachment at Ilmenau (9 battalions, 20 squadrons and 2 batteries under General der Cavallerie Herzog Karl August von Sachsen-Weimar). Wuerttemberg's troops were defeated on 17 October by elements of Marshal Jean-Baptiste-Jules Bernadotte's corps at the attle of Halle; Sachsen-Weimar's command -- subsequently commanded by Generalleutnant Christian-Ludwig von Winning - surrendered to French forces on 7 November at Ratkau.
Prussian-Saxon Army: 49 battalions, 77 squadrons and 12
batteries
Prussian-Saxon Army: 64 battalions, 107 squadrons and 15 ½ batteries [including
Ruechel]
Vierzehnheiligen
today View
in the direction of the Prussian line.

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Prussian Headquarter at Auerstedt 1806. The
large building in the center was used as headquarter. |
uring the night of 13 to 14 October, Davout held the Koesen
pass and occupied Naumburg. It was here that he received the Emperor's
instructions, conveyed to him by Berthier:

The
Emperor has located the Prussian Army with troops stretching from one league in
front of, as well as on the heights of Jena all the way to Weimar, and has the
intention of attacking at dawn. He orders Marshal Davout to advance to Apolda
in
order to fall on the rear of the army.
Napoleon's
orders also stipulated that if Bernadotte (I Corps, 21,200 men) was with him he
could march with Davout, but "the Emperor hopes that he will be at the
position indicated at Dornburg."
When
these instructions reached Davout, Bernadotte was not at the "position
indicated", but next to Davout who asked the future traitor of 1813 to
march with him. Bernadotte, who detested his colleague, refused quoting
Napoleon's instructions and without loosing time, he immediately ordered his I Corps
to march to Dornburg.
Davout
was going to have to fight the Prussians alone with his III Corps. With only
three divisions, and it is important that we should name them here: Morand,
Friant and Gudin, in all less than 29,000 men, including the 1,620 men of Vialannes'
cavalry brigade, and 55 cannon.
Gudin's
troops were on the move from Naumburg before 6:30am. By 7 am the 1st Chasseurs
were stopped cold in their tracks outside of Poppel by Prussian cavalry and
artillery. There was a heavy fog that had lifted just as they approached the
village. Once Davout became aware of the Prussian force he ordered Gudin to
deploy his force at Hassenhausen.
Rehehausen
today

The present
Prussian commander on the field was Schmettau and his division was actually
under orders to proceed down the very road that Davout was on to block his
advance in the Pass at Koesen. While his troops were deploying to attack
Hassenhausen, Bluecher arrived with his cavalry and deployed on his left.
Together they attacked Gudin's troops and pushed them back to the village.
The
village of Poppel today

Wartensleben
arrived at 8:30am with Brunswick who ordered his infantry to the left flank and
his cavalry to the right. The rest of the French cavalry arrived at 9 am and
was placed on Gudin's left. Friant and the 12pr artillery arrived at 9:30am and
moved in squares on Gudin's right. The advance of the French squares forced
Bluecher's cavalry back. Seeing no other option available he ordered his
cavalry to attack. At this very moment two of Wartensleben's regiments attacked
Hassenhausen.
Everything failed, three cavalry regiments
were routed and the infantry fell back. At this critical point, Brunswick
needed to take drastic action. Shortly before 10 am he ordered a full assault
on Hassenhausen. By 10 am Brunswick was carried from the field mortally wounded
along with Schmettau who was also badly wounded. With the loss of these two
commanders the Prussian command broke down.
By noon
Schmettau's center was broken and forced back over the Lissbach Stream,
Bluecher's cavalry was blown and Wartensleben was trying to reposition his
troops. The Prussians realized all was now lost and the King ordered a
withdrawal.
The
losses suffered by Marshal Davout's III Corps show the ferocity of the battle
of Auerstedt: between 7,000 to 8,000 men which represented about thirty per
cent of the corps.
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apoleon
initially did not believe that Davout's single Corps had defeated the Prussian
main body unaided, and responded to the first report by saying "Tell your
Marshal he is seeing double". As matters became clearer, however, the
Emperor was unstinting in his praise. Bernadotte was severely censured and came
within an ace of being dismissed on the spot despite being within earshot of
Auerstadt and within marching distance of Jena, he ignored his orders and did
not fire a shot in either battle. Davout was made Duke of Auerstadt. Soult, the
hero of Jena, was not so honoured, possibly because Napoleon judged it best for
reasons of prestige to keep the glory for himself.
On the
Prussian side, Brunswick had been mortally wounded at Auerstadt, and over the
next few days the remaining forces were unable to mount any serious resistance
to Murat's ruthless cavalry pursuit. Davout led his exhausted III Corps into
Berlin on October 25th. Hohenlohe's force surrendered on October 28th,
Bluecher's on November 7th in Luebeck. Prussian resistance
still remained in the territory east of
the River Oder. A small force of the Prussian Army continued to fight with the
Russians against Napoleon.
Over the last
25 years only one group took care of the battlefield area. It was the dedicated
people around M. Peter Graf and Mr. Robert Heyne who restored monuments, set
new markers on the field and promoted the area all over Europe. The
re-enactment held every five years brought tourists to the area. No other
organization cared about the development of the area. The only group who cared
was the "Jena 1806" e.V. organization.
Many soldiers of both sides died in these battles. As part of our heritage we should not forget either side. It should be our goal to honor both sides. The area of both battlefields has not changed much over the last 200 years. To honor both sides the fields should be protected so that the dead could rest in piece.

As always politicians have completely different ideas than the people they are supposed to represent. Click here and you see the ideas the politicians have for the battlefield. It should be our goal not to rest before these politicians scrap there plans.
Continue to see the villages on he battlefield and find out more about the battle and the region. Click here.
Click here for booksClick here.